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ABSTRACT
Various structural, institutional, and policy changes have contributed to
the evolution of business cycles, since World War II business expansions have
been much longer and contractions much shorter than before. Over nearly 200
years of u.s. history expansions have been long relative to contractions when
prices had upward secular trends, and shorter when price trends were down. The
rising price trend since the 1930's fits this pattern, although we find no
association between the rate of inflation during each business cycle and the
relative duration of the phases. Shifts in the industrial composition of
employment, in labor—force participation, and in the distribution of personal
income have all contributed to the post—1945 moderation of cyclical
amplitudes. The variability of economic change was low by historical standards
in both 1948—69 and 1969—81, although the inflation rate was much higher and
real growth on the average lower after 1969. The recent long—term inflation is
attributable mainly to the new persistence of upward price movements in
business cycle contractions rather than to more rapid price increases during
expansions. But prices have always been sensitive to the degree of severity of
business contractions, and they still are. The same is true of short—term
interest rates, although they became more sensitive during 1949—82 than
before. Despite the deep changes in the economy, many basic characteristics of
the business cycle remain unchanged, notably the timing relationships among
groups of leading and lagging indicators.
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Inthe long stretch of time covered by business cycles, the economies of
the industrialized world underwent many profound changes of structure, insti-
tutions, and modes of operation. Business cycles continued to have much in
common as the most durable and pervasive form of short—term motion of these
economies, but they also changed significantly. This study seeks to identify
and analyze some of these changes. We concentrate on the longer and relatively
well-established developments in the United States.
Sections I and II review some historical facts and hypotheses concerned
with types of change in cyclical behavior. Next we take a long—run view of the
durations of cyclical phases, note the shifts in the relative length of expan-
sions and contractions (III), and relate them to changing trends in prices (Iv).
Section V examines the amplitudes of cyclical movements in production and
employment during the last hundred years. There follows an analysis of
structural shifts in employment and their cyclical effects (VI); trends and
cyclical changes in unemployment and labor—force participation (VII); and the
consequences for the business cycles of the altered composition of personal
income, reflecting the expansion of government, transfer payments, etc. (VIII).
discussion of the relationship between growth and variability of economic
change (Ix) completes this part of our report.
The remaining sections deal with changes in particular categories of cycli-
cal indicators. Of particular interest here is the behavior of wholesale or
producer prices CX) and interest rates (XI). Also, we examine the consistency
of timing of the leading, coincident, and lagging indicators over as long a time
period as the data allow (XII). Finally, we present our conclusions and
suggestions for further research.—2—
I. Business Cycles and Growth: Background and Some Hypotheses
Business cycles defined as recurrent sequences of persistent and, pervasive
expansions and contractions in economic activities are at least as old as the
modern industrialization and growth processes in the principal capitalist
countries. The earliest evidence of their presence, from British and U. S.
business annals and statistics, reach back into the eighteenth century.
The impressively high long—term growth rates of the era are well documented
by the series of decade averages that reveal upward trends in employment,
output, capital, productivity, and per capita consumption (see., e.g., Kuznets,
1971; U. S. Department of Commerce, 1973). However, over shorter periods,
growth of the major private—enterprise economies was very uneven. Each decade
witnessed at least one contraction of aggregate economic activity in each coun—
try, but more typically two and sometimes three. This refers to all countries
covered by the business annals ('rhorp, 1926) and the NBER business cycle chrono—
logies (Burns and Mitchell, 1946).1 Most of these setbacks were mild but some
were serious. A contraction was always followed by an expansion, which as a
rule would consist of a recovery to the highest levels previously attained and a
phase of net growth ending in a new record high ("peak") of activity, only on a
few occasions did a peak fail to exceed the preceding peak. Similarly,
successive troughs usually reached higher levels, except when a particularly
weak recovery or deep depression occurred. Thus overall growth was achieved
through expansionary spurts punctuated every few years by mild but generalized
slowdowns or recessions and at longer irregular intervals by major depressions.
During this epoch, the economies, societies, and political systems involved
changed profoundly in many respects. There is substantial agreement among those
who studied the subject intensively that business cycles are "a product of
culture ... foundonly in modern nations where economic activities are—3—
organized mainly through business enterprises and where individuals enjoy
considerable freedom in producing, pricing, trading, and saving or investing"
(Burns, 1968, p. 228).2 It is therefore plausible to look for important changes
in business cycles as a result of the changes in the structure of production,
markets, institutions, and policies.
It is also possible to argue that the influence runs partly in the opposite
direction and to see in the development of business cycles a major instrument
for changes in the economy and society. Marx predicted a trend toward intensi-
fication of crises as capital—labor ratios increase, workers are displaced and
pauperized, and profit rates fall, but his predictions were belied by the spread
of prosperity and the capacity of capitalism and democracy first to survive and
then to avoid severe depressions and bouts of high unemployment.Keynes worried
about whether investment will absorb saving at full employment in countries
growing in wealth, where capital accumulation lowers the return to investors.
Hansen moved further, expecting weaker booms and deeper slumps to result from
reduced opportunities for investment and increased propensity to save in "mature
economies" with slower population growth. History dealt as harshly with these
new "secular stagnation" hypotheses as it did with the earlier ones.3 Yet they
are revived in various forms whenever sluggish business conditions prevail for
some time, as in the recent period of so—called stagflation.
Conversely, in times of substantial stability and growth such as the mid—
1920s and 1960s in theUnitedStates, the idea tends to gain ground that busi—
ness cycles are becoming "obsolete" or are being "ironed out" by better public
and business policies. In 1921—29, the Federal Reserve System "took——and
perhaps even more was given——credit for the generally stable conditions that
prevailed, and high hopes were placed in the potency of monetary policy as then
administered"(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 240). In the mid—1960s, many—4—
economists believed that the new use of discretionary fiscal policy was on its
way to "dethroning the cyclical model" (Heller, 1966; see also R. A. Gordon,
1969, pp. 26—29).
II. Three Types of Change
It is useful to distinguish three types of change in the cyclical behavior
of the market—oriented economies:
1. long—term or secular trends;
2. discontinuous or episodic changes; and
3. cyclical chanqes.
The hypotheses noted in section I envisage a gradual intensification or a
gradual moderation of business cycles, and hence concern the first type. These
are presumably irreversible changes or trends that can be projected.
The second type are temporary changes observed in particular periods. They
may or may not continue and may or may not be reversed.
The third type refers to "cycles of cycles." Here the NBER—designated
business cycles are viewed as subdivisions of longer major cycles or as mixtures
of several distinct types. Four patterns, named for the economists who have
investigated them in detail, are found in the literature:
1. The Kondratieff (about 48 to 60 years). These "long waves" have
been associated with large movements in the level of prices and
perhaps also with major technological innovations, hut they do not
show up in the volumes of production and consumption. Too few of
such swings have been observed to prove or disprove their existence
conci,' ively.
2. The Kuznets (15 to 25 years). These cycles have been associated
with construction of buildings and transport facilities (highways,
rail lines, etc.), growth of population and labor force, urban—5—
development, and business formation. Here there is more supportive
evidence of an historical nature.
3. The Juglar (about 7 to 10 years). These are the "major" business
cycles, such as the Great Depression of the 1930's, that have
received a great deal of attention in academic literature.
4. The Kitchin (about 3 to 4 years). These- "minor" or "40—month"
business cycles are often related to fluctuations in inventory
investment.
Schumpeter (1939, vol. I, ch. v) developed the much—discussed scheme of
three Kitchins per Juglar and six Juglars per Kondratieff. Burns and Mitchell
(1946, ch. 11) reported largely negative or inconclusive results from tests of
the former hypothesis for the United States. More generally, they found that
long—run cyclical changes rarely had a dominant influence on the short—run
cyclical behavior of a sample of U. S. series on general business activity,
prices, production, investment in capital goods, and yields and the volume of
trade in security markets.
Business cycles have certainly varied greatly in amplitude, diffusion, and
duration, and important distinctions can be made between major and minor cycles,
e.g., with respect to the relative roles and behavior of monetary aggreqates,
fixed investment, and inventory investment. But these matters will not occupy
us here. There is little evidence of periodicities in the occurence of groups
of major and minor cycles. However, we shall consider, in the light of present-
ly available data, one old hypothesis related to the Kondratieff cycles, namely
that business cycle expansions have tended to benger (and larger?) and
contractions shorter (and smaller?) during the upward phases of the long waves
in prices than during the downward phases.—6—
This paper, then, will focus in particular on the "secular" changes in
cyclical behavior, a category that would naturally seem to deserve most atten—
tion. However, the secular and the discontinuous changes are not necessarily
clearly differentiated. Not all trends can be safely projected and not all
changes labeled secular may prove to be irreversible.
III. Durations of Cyclical Phases Before and After World War II
Studies of business cycles in the pre—World War II era have not been able
to document major changes of either secular or discontinuous type. Tests by
Burns and Mitchell (1946, oh. 10) gave little or no support to the view that
substantiallong—term changes occurred in the durations and amplitudes of cycli-
cal movements in thesampleof long U. S. time series. Mills' (1926) hypothesis
thatthe cycles tend to get shorter in stages of rapid growth also failed to be
confirmed by these tests. Comparisons of cycles before and after 1914 (then
often alleged to have marked a "break" in American business history) indicated
more basic similarities than differences, although the fluctuations during the
period between the two world wars were unusually large.
Such major changes of systematic nature as can be observed in aggregate
measures and particular aspects of cyclical behavior refer principally to com-
parisons between the period after World War II and the earlier era. As shown in
Table 1, the eight contractions of 1945—82 were on the average much shorter, and
the eight expansions much longer, than the corresponding phases in each of the
three subsets with equal numbers of consecutive business cycles that together
span the preceding century (lines 1—4, columns 3 and 5). In 1846—1945,
the mean duration of expansions was 30 months, that of contractions 20 months;
in 1945—82, expansions averaged 45 months and contractions 11 months.
Table 1—7—
The proportions of time that the economy spent declining dropped from 41%
in 1846—1945 to 20% in 1945—82 (column 9). These results are altered but
little, to 45% and 25%, respectively, when five cycles are omitted that include
the long wartime expansions and the relatively short postwar contractions
(column 10). The mean durations of the pre—1945 and post-1945 peacetime
expansions are 26 and 34 months; contractions, 21 and 11 months.
A few of the mildest contractions in the NBER chronology of the 19th cent-
ury cycles may have been actually episodes of below—trend but still positive
growth rates, that is, pronounced retardations rather than absolute declines
(Zarnowitz, 1981). That is, the chronology may have (inadvertently) recognized
some growth cycle slowdowns rather than recessions, which would tend to make
expansions and contractions more nearly equal in length (see Moore and
Zarnowitz, section VIII, in this volume). But allowing for this possibility
would not significantly alter our conclusions. The proportions of time in
contractions for peacetime cycles, recalculated on this assumption, would be 40%
pre—1945 and (an unchanged) 25% post—1945.
Contractions became more uniform in length after World war ii (column 6).
Expansions became less uniform but this is chiefly the effect of thewars, all
but one of which occurred in the last two of our four periods (column 4).
With regard to the total cycle durations, neither the means nor the stan-
dard deviations indicate any significant trends. Expansions lengthened andcon-
tractions shortened drastically but cycle lengths remained about thesame
(columns 7 and 8).
One of the implications of these findings is that contractions have become
more predictable as to length than they were in earlier times. For example, if
we take two standard deviations as the likely range, this was eight months in
the period 1945—82. Added to the mean of 11 months, this makes 19 months the-8—
pracical upper limit. In fact, no contraction in this period lasted more than
17 months. Before 1945, the estimated ranges was 26 months, yielding an upper
limit of 46 months, which was not exceeded even in the Great Depression (43
months).
IV. Business Cycle phases and Long—Term Trends in prices
Between 1789 and 1932, wholesale and consumer prices in the tlhited States
have followed alternating upward and downward trends (Table 2). The long up-
swings lasted between 21 and 25 years, the long downswings varied more, from 12
to 32 years. These movements largely cancelled each other over the entire
stretchof more than 140 years, so that the level of prices at the bottom of the
Great Depression was not much higher than when George Washington took office.
Thehalf—century since 1932, however, witnessed the longest, largest, and most
continuous inflation on record. Except in the recessions of 1937—38 and
1948—49, no significant price—level declines occurred in this period. Wholesale
prices increased by a factor of almost 9, consumer prices by a factor of 7 (cf.
columns 4—7 of the table).
Table 2
Apart from the secular trends, the comprehensive price indexes show gen-
erally procyclical short—term movements. Before 1932, they rose during most
business expansions and fell during most business contractions, conforming in
this sense about three quarters of the time.4 In periods of upward trend, the
cyclical rises in prices were on the average large and the declines small; in
periods of downward trend, the opposite situation prevailed, i.e., the rises
tended to be small and the declines large (columns 8 and 9). But after 1949
prices kept increasing even wh the economy declined, although virtually every
major slowdown and recession was associated with a temporary reduction in the
inflation rate.—9—
To be sure, the long—period averages in Table 2 conceal a very large amount
of variation over time, both between the wartime and peacetime episodes and
among the latter. Nonetheless, it is important to note that over the last fifty
years as a whole inflation became a grave problem not because it was unusually
high during expansions but because, unlike in earlier times, it was only slowed,
not reversed, during contractions. The booms have not grown more inflationary
hut the deflationary slumps have disappeared. Indeed, the average percentage
increase per year in wholesale prices is 1.8 for the ten recessions of 1937—82,
substantially higher than the 1.2 figure for the entire 193 year period covered
in Table 2.
In his introductory chapter to Thorp's Business Annals (1926, pp. 65—66),
Mitchell observed that the ratios of "prosperous" to "depressed" years have beers
systematically higher in periods of rising trends in wholesale prices than in
periods of declining trends. For the United States and England, the former
ratios averaged 2.7 and 2.3, the latter 0.8 and 0.6, respectively. About twenty
years later, armed with better and longer chronologies, Burns and Mitchell
confirnied the hypothesis that long swings in prices were associated with the
relative length of business cycle expansions and contractions (1946, pp. 437—438
and 538). The results based on their data for Great Britain, France, and
Germany are presented in Table 3, sections B, C, and 0. Section A shows more
detailed findings for the United States, based on longer and updated records
(see Moore, 1983, ch. 15).
Table 3
In each period of rising trend in prices, expansions last 'onthe average
much longer than contractions, in most instances more than twice as long. In
each period of falling trend in prices, expansions tended to be either about as
lonq as contractions (this is so for the United States) or considerably shorter—10—
thancontractions (for the other countries). These contrasts are both regular
and large (Table 3, columns 2, 5, and 7).
As a result, the relative frequency of expansions has been greater in the
long upswings of prices, that of contractions in the long downswings (cf.
columns 1 and 4). Hence the total phase durations and their ratios add further
emphasis to the showing of the corresponding statistics for the average phase
durations (columns 3, G, and 8).
Prices have risen strongly in wartime expansions, but the relationship doc-
umented above does not rely mainly on this fact. When the five major wars of U.
S. history are excluded (as in lines 2—5 of the table), the contrast between the
periods of upward and downward price trends is not much diminished.
How should the association between the price trends and the relative dura-
tion of business cycle phases be interpreted? With prices in the short run
being less than fully flexible, fluctuations in aggregate demand, whatever their
causes, will be met in part by output movements, in part by price adjustments.
As a result, cyclical changes in output and prices will tend to be positively
correlated. Beyond that, actual and expected price—level rises may temporarily
stimulate economic activity if they are perceived as favorable movements in
relative prices and profits, and analogously price—level declines may be dis-
couraging if taken as signals of adverse changes in the same variables. But
these can only be very short—lived effects insofar as they depend on mispercep-
tions of general for relative price movements due to information lags. Propaga-
tion mechanisms that may amplify and prolong the consequences of such errors
have been suggested, however, and views on the matter are still divided, as
reflected in the recent debates on the equilibrium models of business cycles
(Zarnowitz, 1984). But few have argued that long—run trends in the level of
prices have clear and lasting effects on real activity, or that secular infla——11—
tion is necessary for economic growth. There is essential agreement that the
long price movements reflect mainly trends in money and credit creation which
have no definite, permanent effects on the evolution of the economy in real
terms.
Indeed, there appears to be no association between the rate of inflation
during each business cycle and the relative length of expansion versus contrac-
tion. The E/C ratios for the two cycles between 1953 and 1960 (3.9 and 3.0)
were not unlike the ratio for the 1973—80 cycle (3.6), but inflation averaged a
little over one percent per year in 1953—60 and 9 percent per year in 1973—80.
GNP in constant dollars advanced at similar average annual rates in the two
periods (2.6% and 2.8%), while unemployment increased from 4.9% in 1953—60 to
6.6% in 1973—80. As is well known, growth in the supply of money and credit
accelerated sharply in the intervening twenty years; this resulted in more in-
flation and higher interest rates without stimulating the economy and reducing
unemployment.
Prices tend to move up briskly when expansions gather steam, particularly
in the boom phases at high levels of capital and labor utilization; they often
used to decline and now typically rise more slowly in business contractions,
particularly long slumps. This reflects both the cyclical fluctuations in
aggregate demand and the typical reactions of businessmen. In a recession,
costs are cut, profit margins are pared, and discounts are given to move heavy
inventories or prevent their costly accumulation. Failures increase and going—
out—of—business sales at low prices multiply as well. Wages rise more slowly
and are red-.d here and there under the pressure of increased layoffs and unem—
ployment. Costly overtime work is cut back or eliminated. Consumers become
more economical and cautious, especially about borrowing and spending on durable
goods. All of this works in the direction of lower prices or at least lower—12—
inflation rates. Thus it is not surprising that the trends are toward less in-
flation (or more deflation) in periods during which business contractions are
relatively long and frequent, and that the converse applies to periods dominated
by expansions (see also Moore, 1983, chapters 14 and 15).
Thus it is not the long inflations that should be credited with shortening
recessions and lengthening expansions; rather the opposite chain of influence
deserves to be considered, in combination with the multiplicity of factors that
would historically account for the shifts in the relative duration of business
cycle phases. These include money and credit trends and financial innovations;
changes in the structure of production, employment, and markets; changes in
economic policies, institutions, and regulations; and major external shocks such
as wars, financial crises, large failures, explosions and collapses of basic
commodity prices, gold discoveries, etc. To apportion these influences to the
observed shifts in the nature of business cycles would surely be an important
but massive research undertaking which cannot be attempted here.
V. The Reduced Severity of Recessions Since World War II
The limitations of the available time—series data make it difficult to
measure the amplitude of business cycles, particularly over long historical
periods for which there ar few monthly or quarterly statistics as comprehensive
as such current indicators as real GNP, personal income, manufacturing and trade
sales, employment, etc. To compare the size of recent expansions and coritrac—
tons with those of the more distant past, about the best we can do is to use
indexes of business activity or production and nonagricultural employment (Table
4).
Table 4
These comparisons are inevitably crude because of compositional shifts in
the available measures of business activity and employment.5 In particular,—1 3—
factory or manufacturing employment (used before 1929) is typically more
variable over the business cycle than total nonagricultural employment which
inludes a large and rising share of the relatively stable services (see next
section) •Butsuch differences in the data probably account only in part for
the large contrasts observed between the averge percentage amplitudes in Table
4. These measures are much smaller for 1945—82 than for 1912—45 or 1914—45.
The cyclical movements in busines activity and employment were also on the
average smaller in 1885—1912 or 1891—1914 than in the period during and between
the two world wars, but by much lesser margins.
The ranking of the three subperiods is the same for expansions and
contractions but the relative differences between the average amplitudes are
greater for contractions. The exclusions of the wartime cycles does not alter
the qualitative findings just summarized (its main consequence is to reduce the
average expansion amplitudes for the periods concerned). When the amplitudes of
expansions and contractions are added without regard to sign, the results once
more confirm the shifts toward smaller movements of production and employment
after 1945, for both all and peacetime cycles (columns 1, 3, and 5).
The cyclical movements in the series covered were in general less variable
in 1945—82 than in the earlier periods, as indicated by the standard deviations
of the individual amplitude measures (columns 2, 4, and 6). This applies
strongly and without exceptions to the comparisons with 1912—1945 or 1914—1945.
What these measures suggest, then, is that business contractions have been
on the average milder in the post—World War II era and also that their depth
varied less across the recent cycles than it did in earlier times. These
findings parallel those on the shorter and more uniform durations of the recent
contractions as reported in section III above.
The moderation of business cycles, manifest in the relatively brief, mild,—14—
and infrequent recessions of the 1950s and 1960s was clearly an international
phenomenon. Extraordinarily long and vigorous expansions occurred in Japan,
West Germany, France, and Italy. One presumed reason lies in unique initial
conditions. The end of the war found F'urope and the Far East economically in
stages of unprecedented exhaustion. Yet the war left behind not only the ruins
of much of the physical capital of industry and commerce but also huge backlogs
of unutilized and skilled human resources and unsatisfied demand. What followed
was an era of Great Reconstruction: first a restoration of sound currencies and
free markets, then rapid growth of employment, output, investment, and trade.
Cyclical setbacks assumed for some time the form of retardations of growth
rather than absolute declines. The U. S. economy, starting after the war from
so much higher levels, intact and very strong, grew more slowly than Japan and
Western Europe (other than the United Kingdom).6 Here mild contractions
continued to recur, although the expansion in the 1960s persisted beyond all
previous experience and expectations.
This record suggests the hypothesis that higher rates of real growth, which
prevailed in many countries in the first quarter century after 1945 under condi-
tions favoring capital formation and international trade and development, tend
to be associated with less cyclical instability. We shall examine the U. S.
evidence on this point in section IX below.
nother type of partial explanation relies on structural changes that make
the contemporary highly developed economies less recession prone. Trends in the
industrial composition of employment illustrate such changes (Section VI).
Shifts in the structure of personal income provide another example (Section
viii). Here post—depression reforms concerning taxes and transfer payments
which act as "built—in stabilizers" have played an important role.7
There are still other general hypotheses which are by no means incompatible—15—
with those noted above. Probably the one most discussed is that discretionary
demand management has become more sophisticated and effective in reducing
cyclical instability. This is obviously a critical issue but also one very
difficult to test. Most observers would likely agree that some successes were
scored by U. S. monetary and fiscal policies in the 1950s and 1960s but that the
record was mixed and marked by increasing errors on the inflationary side. The
topic will not be pursued here.
VI. Structural Shifts in Employment and Their Cyclical Effects
The share of U. S. employment accounted for by agriculture dropped from 48
percent in 1869 to 21 percent in 1929 and 4 percent in 1970. Business cycles
have contributed to major swings in food prices but they have weak effects on
the number of persons engaged in, and total output of, farming. Business cycles
are to a large extent a product of industrialization. Despite the great
importance of the strong downward trend in agricultural employment, we shall
concentrate on shifts in the industrial composition of nonagricultural
employment, for two reasons. (1) In recent times, the changing nature of
business cycles has been strongly influenced by these shifts, much less so by
the developments in agriculture, partly because the percentage employed in
farming, though still declining, has already reached very low levels.(2) Over
the longer run, the huge shift away from agriculture would overshadow the trends
we wish to examine.
Table S shows that in total nonagricultural employment, the combined share
accounted for by manufacturing, mining, construction, and transportation,
communications, and public utilities was stable in 1869—99 at about 56% but
declined steadily to 48% by 1929. In the five cycles between the peaks of 1929
and 1957, that share fluctuated in th& narrow range of 43%—46%, but in the next
five cycles, 1957—81, it fell steadily from 42% to 33%. The gainers included—16—
trade, insurance, real estate, personal and business services, and government——
all service industries in the broad sense. This sector as a whole employed 44%
of all persons engaged in nonagricultural production in 1869, 51% in 1929, and
67% in 1979—81 (cf. columns 9 and 10 in Table 5).
Table S
In the present context, the importance of this strong trend in the composi-
tion of employment rests on the fact that the rising industries have been much
less recession—prone than the dclining industries. The net result was a sub-
stantial reduction in the sensitivity of total employment to cyclical
fluctuations in aggregate demand.
Table6 provides the evidence. The average drop in employment during the
recessions of 1948—82 varied from 10% per year for durable manufactures to4—5%
for the other sensitive industries: nondurable manufactures, mining, construc-
tion, and transportation, etc. In trade, the declines averaged less than 1%,
and in services, finance, and government employment actually increased by about
2%, so these industries have been more resistant to cyclical declines (column 3).
Table 6
When the firstfour post—World War Icontractions (1948—60) are separated
fromthe last four (1970—82), some shifts in detail are observed but the same
division between the relativelyrecession—prone and recession—proof industries
holds(columns 1and2). Indeed,employmentin most of the latter decreased
muchless or increased much more during the recessions of 1970—82 than during
those of 1948—60.
If the 1959 distribution of employment among the nine uajor industries had
prevailed in the four recessions of 1948—60, the average reduction in nonagri-
cultural employment would have been (other things equal) 2.5 percent. For 1970—
82, the corresponding estimate is 2 percent, for all eight contractions 1948—82—17--
it is 2.3 percent. With the 1969 distribution, the reductions would have been
2.3, 1.8, and 2.0 percent for 1948—60, 1970—82, and 1984—82, respectively. With
the 1982 distributions, the estimates are 1 .7, 1 .0, and 1 .3 percent.
Between 1929 and 1959 shifts of this type were probably much less impor-
tant, as Table 5 suggests. Now we see that they had significant effects between
1959 and 1969 and much stronger effects between 1969 and 1982. Will they endure
asa source of employment stabilization in the future? Ten years ago the U. S.
Bureau ofLabor Statistics made projections to 1985 which assumed that the share
of government and private service industries would continue to increase. Their
most recent projections to 1995, however, imply a cessation (but not a reversal)
of the overall shift toward the more recession—proof industries (Table 6, column
7). The rise in personal and business services is expected to be offsetby a
relative decline in government employment.
The expansion of the share of government in the economy persisted so long
that even many who deplore this development regard it as nearly inevitable
("Wagner's Law"). Yet it is not a natural, irreversible tendency and forces
opposed to it may be getting stronger.
The demand for services generally is often hypothesized to be more income—
elastic than the demand for goods, but Fuchs (1968, pp. 3—5) noted that the
proportion of services in total output was the same in 1965 as in 1929. He sug-
gested that the shift of employment from Industry to Service is explained
largely by the higher labor requirements in the latter sector. Output per
worker grew much more slowly in the production of services than in the produc-
tion of goods.8 But real output of services, and therefore productivity, is
difficult to measure and often poorly estimated. The notion of a continuing
shift into less productive industries and occupations seems worrisome and hard
to reconcile with competitive markets. In the current controversy on new—18--
industrial policies, proponents urge a government—supported
"reindustrialization" drive which, they claim, would make the u. S. economy more
productive and more competitive internationally. If this reverses the trend
described above, however, the consequences for cyclical stability may offset
some of the benefits.
VII. Trends and Cyclical c.hanges in unemployment and Labor—Force Participation
Although the risk of losing a job has been reduced by the shift in the
industrial composition of employment, the unemployment rate fluctuated around a
rising trend since the late 1960s. In this period shifts of product demand and
derived labor demand between specific markets, industries, and occupations were
accelerated by several developments, notably the intensification, fading, and
end of the Vietnam War; the oil price increases; the swift spread of new prod-
ucts and technologies (computerization); the decline of some old industries such
as steel prompted in part by increasing competition from imports. The unusually
large intersectoral shifts contributed to the increases in unemployment (Lilien,
1982). In addition, other noncyclical factors probably operated in the same
direction. The composition of the labor force shifted toward greater participa-
tion by women and teenagers, groups with relatively high rates of labor market
turnover and unemployment. Higher unemployment benefits and wider coverage have
probably added to the average time spent in job search and hence to theaverage
durationand rate of unemployment. At the same time, the percentage of the
working—age population employed has risen, reaching a peacetime record high in
1979.
'itherecession of 1981—82, the highest attained rate of unemployment was
10.8%, exceeded only by the maximum rate reached during the major depressions of
1920—21 (not much higher) and 1929—33 and 1937—38 (which were extraordinarily
high). On the other hand, theincreasein the unemployment rate in 1981-82 wasnot particularly large. Jobless rates in recent contractions were generally
much higher than in previous contractions of comparable size, 1923—24 and 1926—
27. This can be seen clearly in Table 7, which compares the duration, depth,
and diffusion of tJ. S. business cycle contractions since 1920, using measures of
production, employment, and unemployment.
Table 7
The measures are highly but far from perfectly correlated (see the matrix
of the correlation coefficients in Table 7). Of course, unemployment changes
and levels are inversely associated with the declines in real GNP, industrial
production, and nonf arm employment. The measures of depth or amplitude (columns
2—6) are most closely related to each other, but the correlations involving
duration and diffusion (columns 1 and 7) are also significant.
Comparisons of these and other statistics suggest that four mild recessions
occurred during the 62 years covered in the table, one in the 1920s (1926—27),
and three since 1960 (1960—61, 1969—70, and 1980). There were six sharp
recessions, all but one (1923—24) in the post-World War II period (1948—49,
1953—54, 1957—58, 1973—75, and 1981—82). The three major depressions go back to
1920—21 and the 1930's: the "Great Depression" of 1929—33 was in many respects
unique, and by far the most severe according to all measures. The 1945
recession was also quite particular because of its timing (end of World War II)
and nature (transition back to peacetime production). It was brief and mild in
terms of unemployment, sharp in terms of the decline in industrial production.
The ranks in Table 7, column 8, based on the averages of the ranks of the
entries in each of the columns 1—7, ao-'e with the above classification. The
only ambiguity refers to the sui generis 1945 reconversion episode.
An important caveat should be entered at this point, namely that there is
no way to construct a really satisfactory single measure of the severity of—20—
recessions. Cyclical movements are complex and differentiated in terms of
duration, diffusion, and depth. Some are relatively short but large and
pervasive, e.g., the business contraction of 1937—38; others are of similar
length but small and less widely spread, e.g., the recessions of 1960—61 and
1970. The use of average ranks is a crude approximation procedure, which is
further aggravated by the gaps in the data. Nevertheless, the results appear to
be sensible in that they agree with much broader evidence from historical and
statistical studies. We have experimented with other data without finding any
good reasons to alter our conclusions.9
Coming back to the unemployment rate, it is the change in, rather than the
level of, this variable that deserves most attention as an indicator of relative
cyclical performance. The level attained during a recession is influenced in
part by the level reached during the preceding expansion——i.e., it combines a
measure of the weakness of the preceding expansion with the severity of the re-
cession. Moreover, the level is influenced by trends in the age—sex composition












1957 weights 1967 weights
(1) (2) (3)
1959 5.5 5.4 5.8
1969 3.5 3.1 3.4
1973 4.8 4.1 4.5
1977 7.0 6.0 6.7
The rise in unemployment rate between 1959 and 1977 would have been much
smaller if the age—sex composition of the labor force had remained as it was in
1957 or in 1967. Over the short periods encompassed by recession, however,
these demographic changes are much less consequential, hence the change in the—21—
rate during a recession is less affected by these shifts and more by factors
related to the severity of the recession itself.
In addition, it is important to consider the sensitivity of the labor force
itself to changing market conditions and the implications this has for the
interpretation of the unemployment measures. In a recession, some additional
workers enter the labor force to bolster declining family incomes. At the same
time, some unemployed, frustrated in their job search, withdraw from the labor
market. Indeed, when the prospects for finding work at good wages appear to be
poor, they may not even compensate for the expected search costs, so some would—
be new entrants or reeritrants will not even commence looking for jobs. Here as
elsewhere, then, income and substitution effects can coexist in practice as well
as theory, andthe empiricalquestion is which prevails. The evidence is that
the civilian labor force, apart from its dominant upward trend, tends to respond
positively to business cycles. That is, the "discouraged workers1' effect
generally outweighs the "added workers" effect.
The elasticity of the response of the labor force to cyclical changes in
the demand for workers is in the aggregate not high, perhaps about 0.2 on the
average (Mincer, 1966, p. 88). Much more sensitive are those groups that are
typified by relatively weak (but growing) attachment to the labor force, namely
women and youth (especially working wives and students). On the other hand, the
participation rate of adult men declined fairly steadily from 89% in 1948 to 78%
in 1983. Among older men, age 45 to 64, earlier retirement became financially
more attractive and increasingly frequent in the 1960s and the downward movement
in labor force participation accelerated in the 1970s (e.g., it was 92% in 1960,
90% in 1968, and 86% in 1984; see Bednarzik and Klein, 1977, p. 8).
it has been suggested that, when combined, all these shifts in composition
"imply an over—all trend toward an increasingly sensitive, variable, and flex——22—
iblelabor force" (Mincer, 1967, P. 17). As the labor—force responsiveness of a
group rises, the cyclical amplitude and conformity of its measured unemployment
rate declines. Entries and re—entries become more frequent during expansions
when search costs are low and job conditions favorable. Entry rates decline and
withdrawals rise when business is sluggish, reducing the labor force. }ence the
change in unemployment may understate the true loss of potential employment and
output. According to some indirect estimates, based on regressions of the labor
force on cyclical indicators such as the employment—population ratios, the
"hidden unemployment" was large indeed under relatively adverse labor—market
conditions (several million people in the early 1960s). But the estimates
indicate a heavy concentration of this phenomenon in the categories of
ItsecondaryiP workers who spend a relatively high proportion of time outside the
labor force. Many of these people time their decisions to enter or withdraw in
reaction to changes in labor demand as well as supply and other relevant
factors. Still,tosome extent the labor force variation reflects also the
tendency for discouraged workers to disappear in business expansions and
reappear in contractions (Mincer, 1966, pp. 100—105; 1967, pp. 16_20).h1
The percentage of the working-age population employed is very differently
affected by these factors than is the unemployment rate.In 1983, for example,
almostexactly the same percentage of the working—age population (1 6 years and
over) was employed asin1973, namely58.3%. (In these calculations, employment
includesresident ArmedForces.) Other data, such as real personal income per
capita or real compensation per hour, indicate that both years were about
equally prosperous, but the unemployment rate in 1983 was nearly twice as high
as in 1973, 9.5% compared with 4.8%. If calculated as a percentage of the
working—age population instead of the labor force, unemployment was more than
twice as high, 6.1% compared with 2.9%. What happened was that a massive shift
occured in the disposition of the population to seek jobs. This pushed up the—23--
unemployment rate but did not signify any great change in the availability of
jobs per capita, which is measured by the employment percentage. Since the two
measures do not always give the same message regarding employment conditions, it
is important to consider both in evaluating the severity of recessions.
VIII. Changing Sources of Personal Income and the Business Cycle
According to annual estimates by Creamer (1956, p. 126), personal income in
constant dollars fell during five business contractions and rose during three in
the period 1910—38. The average of these changes was —5.0 percent. Correspond-
ing annual measures for the eiqht business contractions of 1948—82, based on the
present Department of Commerce data, show a reverse picture: three declines and
five rises, averaging +0.7 percent. Hence, real income has become farmore
stable during business cycles since World War II than before.
The composition of personal income by major types and sources shows that
several long—term shifts have contributed to this increasing stability (Tables8
and 9). Wage and salary disbursements of government rose most of thetime,
accounting for S to 6 percent of total income in the business cycle peakyears
1913 and 1929, but more than twice as much——il to 14 percent——in thepeak years
of 1953—8 1 •Transferpayments rose most strongly and persistently, from less
than 1% of the total in 1929 and before to 19% in 1981•Therelative decline in
farmers' income, from 10% in 1913 to 1% in 1981, was slow in the first half of
the period covered, rapid in the second half. Nonfarm proprietors' incomealso
fell decisively in relative terms, from 15% to 4%. Wages and salaries in the
private sector, by far the largest component of personal income, increased from
48% in 1913 to 58% in 1953, then fell back again to 48% in 1981.
Table S—24—
ofthetypes of property income, the shares of two show downward trends:
dividends (6—7 percent in 1913—17, 2—4 percent thereafter) and, particularly,
rent (from 11% down to 1% between 1913 and 1981). The proportion of interest
income fluctuated roughly between 3% and 6% in the peak years 1913—53 but grew
from 6% in 1960 to 8% in 1969, then rapidly to 13% in 1981 during the period of
high inflation.
Table 9 classifies these types of income into two groups: those that have
been relatively recession—proof and those that have been recession—prone. In
general, the categories whose shares increased have been relatively recession—
proof (interest, rental income) or even countercyclical (transfers), while the
categories whose shares drifted mostly downward have been generally recession—
prone (proprietors' incomes and wages of private workers). Income of government
employees and transfer payments did not decline even in the severe depression of
1937—38 and neither did rent, while the downturn in interest income was moder-
ate. Although dividends fell sharply in 1937—38, they often resisted the milder
recessions in the post—World War II period (but note their drop in 1981—82).
Labor income in the private sector typically declined at least moderately in
recessions, mainly due to wages. It should be noted that the measures for 1937—
38 and 1948—49 (columns 1 and 2) are based on data in current dollars, the
measures for the 1948—80 averages and 1981—82 (columns 3 and 4) on data in
constant dollars. It was, of course, necessary to adjust the recent figures for
the effects of high inflation which masked the cyclicality of the nominal income
series during most of the post—World War II era.
Table 9
Suppose the cyclical changes in each of the sources of personal income were
as observed and taken to be independent of the shifts in the distribution of the
aggregate. How would the changes in the composition of income by sources influ——25—
ence the movements of total income under this assumption? The answer given by
the estimates in the bottom section of Table 9 is "strongly." Forexample, had
the relative importance of the main categories of income been the same in 1981
as in 1948, the reweighted decline of real personal income during the 1981—82
recession would have been 4.3 percent instead of the actual 7/10 of one percent
(column 4). rjsing the 1948 weights would have doubled the relative amplitude of
the average decline in real personal income in the seven recessions of 1948—80,
from the observed 1.1 to the estimated 2.3 percent (column 3). Conversely, the
1937—38 decline, which was actually 7.7 percent, would have been ceteris paribus
only 4.1 percent under the distributional conditions of 1960 and 1 .2 percent
under those of 1981 (column 1)!
To be sure, hypothetical calculations of this type must be interpreted with
great caution. The critical assumption that the amplitude of income change for
each category is independent of the compositional shifts could be undermined by
various factors. For example, transfer incomes may support consumption but
their strong upward trend, with its implication of rising tax burdens, may at
some point damage business confidence and investment. The rising share of
interest income reflects increasing and high interest rates, which again can
have strong adverse effects on government finance, security markets, and, most
important, real capital formation by business firms and households. The
expansion of government employment, in relative as well as absolute terms,
contributes to the taxpayers' burden. And there are still other possible
complications which the simple global estimates in Table 9 neglect: it may be
'ortant to separate the effects of changing compensation rates and input
volumes and to take account of finer distinctions, e.g., the relative importance
of durables, nondurables, and services in generating personal income. These
qualifications were already made by Creamer and Moore in 1956.
Nevertheless, as projected in that volume nearly thirty years ago, fluctua-—26—
tionsin income that accompany business cycles did moderate significantly, and
there can be little doubt that the trends in the composition of personal income
by major types and sources made a substantial contribution to thisdevelopment.12
IX. Growth Rates and Variability of Economic Chanqe
Although it is true for the period since 1945 as a whole that contractions
have become shorter and milder, there is nonetheless a useful distinction to be
made between the first two decades and the next one. In the 1950s and 1960s
high long—term growth rates prevailed in the U. S. economy as well as among its
major trading partners. Domestically, high inflation was not yet perceived to
be a persistent and grave problem with no easy, apparent solution, and neither
was high unemployment so perceived. Looking back, contemporaries had little
doubt about the contrast between these economically rather placid and prosperous
decades and the turbulent times that followed, dominated by seemingly
uncontrollable inflation, more frequent and serious recessions, energy problems,
and financial instability.
To put such impressionistic comparisons on firmer ground, Table 10 divides
the U. S. economic record since 1903 into six periods each covering from two to
four complete business cycles measured from peak to peak. Three of these show
average annual growth rates in real GNP (g) varying from 3.4 to 3.9 percent:
1903—13, 1923—29, and 1948—69. The other three are characterized by
considerably lower long—term growth ranging from 2.4 to 2.8 percent per year:
1913—23, 1929—48, and 1969—81 (column 7)•13
Table 10
To measure relatively high aiid low economic stability, we use standard
deviations of the annual growth rates in real GNP ().Itturns out that
variability in growth was generally greater in the slower growth periods
(columns 7 and 8). In addition, the more recent periods in both groups showed—27—
less variability than the earlier periods, confirming the point made above
regarding the reduced severity of recessions since World War 11.14
It is also of interest to observe that the proportion of time spent in con-
traction was 15% in 1948—69 and 24% in 1969—81 •Eventhis last figure is much
lower than the corresponding statistics for the earlier periods (cf. columns 4—6).
These measures indicate no correspondence between the average growth rates and
the relative duration of contractions. Thus in 1903—13 and 1923—29, when growth
was relatively high, the percentage of time accounted for by business contrac-
tions exceeded that in 1929—48 and 1969—81, periods with lower growth.
Strong inflationary trends prevailed in 1913—23 and 1969—81, when monetary
aggregates expanded rapidly but real growth was relatively weak. In the other
periods, inflation was fairly moderate or absent. The following tabulation
shows theaverageannual growth rates (%) in real income, the stock of money,
nominal income, and the implicit price deflator (g, m, y, andp,
respectively.15 The periods with relatively high real growth(onthe left) had
on the average lower m, y, and p rates than the periods with lower real growth
(on the right).
g m y p g m y p
1903—13 3.4 6.1 5.4 2.0 1913—232.4 8.8 8.2 4.9
1923—29 3.5 4.1 3.4 —0.2 1929—482.5 5.3 4.2 2.0
1948—69 3.94.7 6.2 2.3 1969—812.8 9.7 10.0 7.0
Average 3.7 5.0 5.0 1.4 Average2.6 7.9 7.5 4.6
X. Changes in the Cyclical Behavior of Prices
Reference cycle patterns provide a simple and useful device for describinq
the movements of a series during buiness cycles. The series is divided into—28—
segments, each of which covers one business cycle dated from the initial to the
final trough. A pattern consists of nine averages, one for each of the consecu-
tive stages of the cycle. Stages I, V, and IX are three—month periods centered
on the initial trough, peak, and terstinal trough of a business cycle, respec-
tively. Stages II, III, and IV cover successive thirds of the expansion,(trough
to peak), and stages VI, VII, and VIII cover similar portions of the contraction
(peak to trough). All measures are in "reference cycle relatives," that is,
percentages of the average standing of the data during the given business cycle.
The procedureretains the intra—cycle trend but eliminates the inter—cycle trend
because the average relative for each cycle is 100. Itshouldbe noted that
referencecycle stages differ in duration as do the individual business
cycles. For certain purposes, therefore, such as comparisons of leads and lags
at turning points, measures in fixed calendar—time units may be preferable. But
an analysis of the patterns can be very revealing in some contexts. This is so
in particular with respect to the identification of any major and persistent
changes in broadly defined cyclical movements, which is our concern here.
We have plotted and inspected 30 reference patterns for U. S. wholesale
prices, one for each of the complete business cycles since 1854. The first
impression is one of great variability, but a closer analysis helps to explain
themain differences and bring out the more persistent traits. The intra—cycle
portionsof the longer trends are often strong enough to have pronounced and
readily visible effects. Thus in 1854—61 a downward local drift came to
dominate the longer upswing in prices, and then between 1864 and 1896 there was
a long downswing which however flattened temporarily in 1885_91.16 Accordingly,
the seven patterns covering the periods 1854—61, 1867-85, and 1891—97 have clear-29—
downward tilts. Between 1896 and 1920 prices tended to move up, with some
levelling off in 1910—14. This left an impress upon the several corresponding
patterns. The weakness of prices in 1920—32 shows up in the downward-tilted
patterns for this period, and their subsequent upward trend in the upward—tilted
patterns for the post—1933 cycles.
Major wars had huge effects on the behavior of prices. The patterns for
1861—67 (stages I—iv) 1914—19 (i—VI), and 1945—49 (I—IV) show the surging
inflations of the Civil War and World War I and the slower, more suppressed
inflation of World War II. The inflations of the Korean and Vietnam wars are
much less conspicuous in the patterns for 1949—54 (III—v) and 1961—70 (III—
IX). After the Civil War, a strong deflation followed immediately; after World
War I, prices first stabilized but then fell sharply in the 1920—21 depression;
but no strong downward movements in the price level trailed any of the later
wars.
The most important findings are as follows. Virtually all business cycle
contractions through 1938 were associated with some declines in prices during at
least some of their stages. When the trend was down, these declines would often
start during the expansions and last longer, hut they would also typically accel-
erate after the peak stage (v). When the trend was up, the rising segments of
the patterns tended to be larger and longer, frequently starting before the
trough and extending beyond the peak, but the contractions would still witness
some significant price—level declines (mainly between stages VI and IX). The only
early patterns which show very weak and irregular price movements, in the 1885—91
period, refer o two short and marginal cycles, an interlude of relative stabil
ity separating major fluctuations dominated by strong deflationary developments
in the early 1880s and 1890s.
The more recent cycles present a sharply contrasting picture. The brief—30—
and peculiar end—of—the—war contraction of 1945 was accompanied by essentially
flat wholesale prices. This year saw the end of wartime price controls. The
last contraction during which prices fell significantly occurred in 1948—49.
The Korean expansion saw new partial wage and price controls and had a phase in
1951 during which prices declined considerably, but in the ensuing contraction
they merely stabilized after a new bout of wartime inflation. The stability
persisted through most of the 1954—57 expansion, too, but prices started rising
again moderately late in the 1957—58 contraction and during the short recovery
of 1958—60, which alarmed many observers since there was little evidence of
excess demand. This ended with the recession of 1960,and several years of
relatively stable prices followed. With the intensification of the Vietnam war
in the mid—1960s, a new and much more intensive round of inflation began, which
the 1970 recession and the 1971 wage and price controls slowed down but a little
and for a short time. After the series of supply shocks in 1973—74 (sharp rises
in prices of food, oil, and other raw materials worldwide, termination of ti. S.
price controls, and after—effects of the switch to floating exchange rates),
inflation accelerated strongly late in the 1973—75 recession and again in the
mid—stages of the 1975—80 expansion, partly due to new supply shocks. It took a
protracted period of poor business conditions in the early 1980s (two
contractions separated by a weak one—year recovery) to reduce the pace of infla-
tion substantially. As a group, the post-World War II patterns, marked by an
absence of any major absolute declines in prices, are strikingly different from
any comparably large subset of earlier patterns where deflation associated with
business contractions was the rule.
By averaging the individual reference patterns stage by stage over some
sufficiently long period, one may hope to bring out the typical features in the
cyclical behavior of the variable concerned. The assumption underlying the pro—31—
cedure is that such persistent traits indeed exist; the more valid this premise
is, the more useful the method.
The upper panel in Chart 1 shows five average reference cycle patterns
based on the measures for the overall wholesale price series used in Chart 1.
The first pattern, for the seven cycles of 1867—97, reflects weak rises during
expansion and strong declines during contraction: the typical behavior in a
period of long—run downward trend in prices. The second, for the five cycles of
1897—1914, when the long drift was up, shows a longer and stronger rise and
weaker decline. The third, for 1919—38 (5 cycles), shows very large and more
symmetrical cyclical movements, with a relatively small downward tilt. The
average for the 17 cycles, 1854—1938, omitting the war—related episodes, is a
nearly symmetrical, slightly downward—tilted pattern rising between each of the
stages I—V and falling between each of the stages V—IX. In clear contrast, the
averages for the seven cycles 1949—82 describe a steadily rising pattern,
althouqh one whose slope is definitely lower in the contraction segment V—IX than
in the expansion segment I—V. In this period, the contractions were associated
with a lower, but not a negative, rate of inflation. Similar results for the
period since 1919 are obtained from an analysis of the index of wholesale prices
for industrial commodities only (omitting farm products and foods). The average
reference patterns for 1919—38 and 1949—82 closely resemble their counterparts
for the all-commodity index.
Chart 1
Cagan (1975, p. 90) concluded that:
The failure of the aggregate index of wholesale prices to
decline in the recessions of 1954 and 1958 and then again
in 1961, which contrasted with thesharpdeclines of
previous recessions, was a new phenomenon.—32—
Ourresults confirm this observation on the basis of longer series than those
used by Cagan (his measures cover the period 1891—1970, ours 1854—1982).
It has 'been suggested that the post-1969 change in the observed behavior
was due to the convergence of downward rigidities due to the increased market
power of firms over prices and of labor unions over wages. Whether such
developments did in fact occur on a sufficiently large scale has been
questioned by some authors but accepted by others (Cagan, 1975, p. 90; DeLong
and Summers, this volume). Another hypothesis is that following the Employment
Act of 1946 the successive administrations demonstrated their commitment to
combatingunemployment so that people came to believe that contractions long or
severe enough to generate any persistent deflationary movements would be effec-
tivelyprevented. This explanation, which appears to be generally consistent
with the evidence, is closely related to the more recent emphasis on the effect
of a credible policy posture on expectations of changes in the price level
(Feliner, 1980).
It is difficult to measure anticipated rates of inflation, but their role
is undoubtedly basic. Cagan compared the average annual rates of change in
wholesale prices during the successive expansions and contractions (to be de-
noted E and C) and computed the differences C —E.This procedure amounts
to using the preceding expansion rates as (admittedly rough) proxies for the
anticipations. In Table 11, we bring Cagan's results up to date. After 1949,
prices ceased declining during contractions: the signs of C change from
negative to positive (see columns 3 and 7). The differences C —Ehave con-
sistently negative signs in the seventeen cycles from 1891 to 1958 (columns 4
and 8). The C rates, even where positive or zero as in 1945, 1953—54, and
1957—58, were smaller than the E rates. In thefour cycles between 1958 and
1980,however, the C —Edifferences turned positive as well.17 The price—33—
response measured in these terms declined consistently in each of thesix
successive business cyles 1945—75. Only in 1980—82 did C —Eresult in a
negative sign, marking a decidedly disinflationary phase (column 9).
Table 11
The wholesale price data make it clear that the magnitude of the post—
world War II inflation in the United States was due, not to an intensification
of upward price pressures during business expansions, but to the increased
length of expansions and the new persistence of such pressures during
contractions. The average percentage increases of prices per year were very
similar in the prewar and postwar expansions (6.3 and 6.4 percent during 1891—
1945 and 1945—82, respectively), but very different in the prewar and postwar
contractions (-6.4 and 3.3 percent, respectively).
Prices have been very sensitive to the severity of business contractions.
In 1891—1945, the wholesale price index fell at an average rate of 15% p.a. in
the five major depressions (MD), at 4% p.a. in the four severe recessions (SR),
and at 6/10 of 1% p.a. in the four mild recessions (MR). The corresponding
average differences C —E,in percentage points, are —21, —12, and —6. In
1945—82 there were no major depressions, but in the five severe recessions the
price index rose 2% p.a., and in the three mild recessions it rose 5% p.a.
The C —Edifferential was —6 for the five SR and +1 .6 for the three MR.
Thusinboth periods prices were responsive to the severity of business de-
clines, but it is clear that the response to recessions of comparable severity
decreased substantially.
Detailed studies of wholesale price changes in the nonwar recessions of
the 1.920s and 1948—70 (Cagan, 1975) indicate that these results are riot attrib-
utable to the changing composition of the index. However, many raw materials—34—
prices retained their usually high cyclical sensitivity.
In a recent analysis of a broad spectrum of price and wage series for
selected periods (1900—14, 1923—29, and 1949—66), Schultze (1981) argued that
until the 1960s low inflation "norms" in the nature of inert rules of thumb
dominated price—level expectations and behavior. In his comments, Feliner
(1981, pp. 577—581) disputed this hypothesis partly on the ground that
Schultze's sample includes mainly years in which prices had a mild upward trend
(in 1923—29 there was a slight downward drift). Had longer and more continuous
price series been used, they would have demonstrated more flexible behavior and
supported the concept of more "rational" expectations. Indeed, the pre—1920
patterns (see Chart 1) seem to us to be broadly consistent with this view.
XI. Changes in the Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rates
Short—term interest rates historically exhibited cyclical movements vary-
ing from moderate to very large relative to their average levels. During busi-
ness cycles containing major booms or slumps and affected by financial crises,
large monetary disturbances, or wars, fluctuations in rates have often been
huge and sudden. Financial markets are particularly sensitive to all types of
factors influencing business conditions, so it is well known and not surprising
that short rates are typically more volatile than most other important variables.
This is well established by an analysis of 27 reference cycle patterns that
covers more than 120 years of U.S. business history.
The patterns for commercial paper rates, 1858—1932, show clear procyclical
movements, consistent with the simple notion that the demand for credit tends to
increaserelative to supply in expansions and decrease in ccractions. The
single major exception was the long but slow 1933—37 recovery from the worst
recorded depression, during which short rates continued to drop sharply.
However, the characteristic timing of the rates was predominately lagging,—35—
particularly at peaks. Rough coincidences prevailed only at the peaks of 1860-
73 and 1923—29. At troughs, the timing was on the average lagging as well but
much less consistently so. A few of the patterns (1861—67 and 1888—91 in
addition to those related to the depressions of 1920—21 and the 1930s) are quite
different from all the others.
The patterns for the 3—month Treasury bill rate in the seven business
cycles 1949—82 have very large amplitudes which bespeaks heightened sensitivity
to cyclical influences.18 They rise sharply during expansions and fall sharply
during contractions but with much variability in timing. Thus their highest
standings are in stages IV (for the 1958—61 cycle), V (1949—54, 1961—70, and
1980—82), VI (1954—58 and 1975—80), and VII (1970—75). ofcourse,in the post—
World War ii period interest rates generally had rising long—term trends; these
were mild in the 1950s and 1960s and strong thereafter, reflecting mainly the
course of inflation and the corresponding adjustments of price expectations. In
basis points, the fluctuations in interest rates were very small until the late
1960s, then steadily increasing to very large size. It is interesting to note
that the amplitudes of the corresponding patterns do not show a similar trend.
That is, relative to their average values in each cycle the movements of bill
rates have been about the same in recent cycles as in the 1950s and 1960s,
whereas in terms of basis points they were small in the early years when the
levels of the rates were low and large in the late years when the levels of the
rates were high.
The average reference cycle patterns in chart 2 bring out the shifts in
amplitude and timing. There is a near symmetry of movement in the diagram for
the four earliest cycles covered (1858—79). The averages for the elevencycles,
1879—1919, show a rise from stage II to VI—Vil and a contraction between stages
VII and II, that is lags at both peaks and troughs. The pattern for the five—36—
cycles of 1919—38 is strongly downward—tilted, with a rise between stages III
and V only (a long lag at troughs). These movements have been large enough to
put a strong imprint on the overall averages (compare the patterns for 1919—38
and 1859—1938). In contrast, the diagram for the Treasury bill rate in seven
cycles, 1949—82, shows a very large rise between stages I and VI, and a somewhat
smaller decline in the contraction stages VI—IX. The average swing in bill
rates since 1949 has been much larger than the average swing in commercial paper
rates before 1938.
Chart 2
Itiscommon knowledge that long—term interest rates fluctuate much less
thanshort—term rates; it is perhaps not so well known that they do not conform
as well to business cycles. Both properties can be inferred from a comparison
of the corresponding reference patterns. In 1900—1914, for example, the only
largecyclical movements evident in high—grade industrial bond yields are those
associated with the crisis and severe depression of 1907: first a rise in
stages uI—vu of the 1904—08 cycle, then a decline continuing through most of
the recovery from that depression. A somewhat similar sequence occurred in
connection with the depression of 1920—21 and the subsequent recovery. The
large irregular movements in the great contraction of 1929—33 with a late peak
in stage VIII (1931), and the long, first rapid then slow decline throughout the
1933—38 cycle are also notable episodes.
The corporate bond yield patterns for the post—World War II years contain
some very large shifts, mostly upward. The timing of these movements has varied
widely, .:i.th rises occurring between the following stages in each consecutive
cycle.
Cycles: 1949—53 1954—58 1958—61 1961—701970—75 1975—801980—82
Stages: I—V 1—VI I—IV h—Vu Ill—VIl111V1 VIII—VI—37—
Consistent with the generally rising trend in yields, lags occurred more
frequently at business cycle peaks than at troughs.
Chart 3
The average reference patterns in chart 3 provide a bird's eye view. The
overall amplitudes of movement in long rates have increased greatly between
1900—38 and 1954—82,but it is the strong upward trend in the recent period that
accounts for this change. Allowing for the trend would tend to eliminate this
difference. The intra-cycle drift tended to be down in the period between the
world wars, strongly up in the last thirty years.
Cagan (1966), comparing the behavior of a broad group of interest rates
before World War I, the 1920s, and the 1950s, noted that they may have become
increasingly sensitive, conforming to moderate business cycles with larger
amplitudes and shorter lags. Our reference cycle patterns are not inconsistent
with this result. b1e 12 indicates that a shift in timing toward shorter lags
and more frequent leads did occur in the early post—World War II period (1945-
60), but that later the lags reasserted themselves. In 1961—82 the lags were
generally longer than in 1919—29, for example. The lags of bond yields behind
bill rates also increased between these two periods (compare the first and
fourth lines in the "Averages" section). On the whole, lags have prevailed
heavily in the timing at troughs for both bills and bonds, but at peaks bills
usually led while bonds lagged. The individual timing comparisons show a high
degree of dispersion.
XII. Changes in the Timigof Leading and Legging Indicators
Since the 1960s, a collection of economic indicators that systematically
lead, coincide with, or lag business cycle turning points has become widely us. -
incurrent economic analysis. The selection of these indicators has been based
upon historical measures of the kind employed earlier in this paper, as well as—38—
upon historical measures of the kind employed earlier in this paper, as well as
upon hypotheses of economic behavior that yield plausible explanations of the
observed leads and lags. Here we examine the historical record of two of the
selected groups of indicators with respect to their timing at business cycle
peaks and troughs.
The longest available record of the timing of the leading and lagging indi-
cators during business cycles covers nearly a century. In Table 13 the median
leads or lags of specific groups of indicators are shown for each business cycle
turn between 1885 and 1982. The indicators in the leading group show an
unbroken record of leads, while those in the lagging group lag at all except two
peaks and three troughs. Moreover, when the turns in the lagging group are com-
pared with the opposite turns in the business cycle, they lead at every turn,
and by longer intervals than the leading indicators do. The economic relations
between the lagging and the leading indicators are such as to make these results
reasonable, according to the considerable literature that has been devoted to
the subject (for a summary and list of references, see Moore, 1983, ch. 21).
From 1885 to 1938, the timing record is based upon 75 leading and 30 lag-
ging indicators, the classification having been determined in 1950. Since the
classification was based on the prior record, it is not surprising that the
leading group led and the lagging group lagged. But the consistency over the
entire periodwasnot controlled by the method of classification, nor was the
relation between the opposite turns in the lagging and leading groups. For the
period 1948 to 1982, the record was based upon twelve leading and six lagging
indicators selected in 1975. Again the prior record was examined in maki'q the
selection. As has been shown elsewhere, however, the behavior of a group of
indicators selected in 1950, without benefit of the subsequent record, was quite
similar during 1948—75 to the record shown in Table 13 (Moore, 1983, ch. 24).—39—
At business cycle peaks the average length of lead of the leading group,
1885—1982, was seven months, with a standard deviation of six months. At
troughs the mean and standard deviation were about half as large, four and three
months,respectively. There issome evidence in the tablethatthe leads at
peakshavebecome longer and the leads at troughs shorter since 1948 than before
(seebelow).
Thelags of the lagging group average five months at peaks and seven months
at troughs, with standard deviations of four and five months, respectively.
When the turns in the lagging group are compared with the opposite turns in the
business cycle, the leads that emerge are quite long, averaging 21 months at
peaks and ten months at troughs. They are also quite variable, with standard
deviations of twelve months at peaks and eight months at troughs.
What Table 13 reveals, then, is an almost unbroken sequence of turning
points during successive business cycles over the past hundred years. In view
of our finding in section III that the principal shift in the length of business
cycle phases took place after World War II, it is of interest to examine the
sequence before and after 1945, as in the following summary:
Average Interval in Months
1885 1948 1885
—1945 —1982 —1982
A. Business cycle peak to peak in lagging indicators 6 4 5
B. Peak in lagging indicators to trough in leading indicators 7 4 6
C. Trough in leading indicators to business cycle trough 5 3 4
D. Business cycle trough to trouqh in lagging indicators 6 9 7
E. Trough in lagging indicators to peak in leading indicators 12 16 13
F. Peak in leading indicators to business cycle peak 6 10 7
A +B + C.Business cycle contraction 18 11 15
D +E+F.Business cycle expansion 24 35 27—40—
Each of the intervals into which the business cycle contraction is broken
by these turning points has become shorter, on average, while each of the inter-
vals that constitute the business cycle expansion has become longer. This in
itself supports the finding of a major shift in the length of business expan-
sions vis—a—vis contractions, since the intervals between the indicator turning
points (though not their sum) are independent of the business cycle chronology.
One other noteworthy feature of Table 13 is the evidence that the lengths
of the leads or lags at successive turning points are positively correlated. The
correlation coefficients (r) are as follows:
All Excluding
At Business Cycle peaks, 1887—1981 Observations 1933 and 1937
Trough in Lagging and peak in Leading +.46 +.70
Peak in Lagging and Peak in Leading +.43 +.47
At Business Cycle Troughs, 1885—1982
Peak in Lagging and Trough in Leading +.43 +.53
Trough in Leading and Trough in Lagging +.34 +.35
The correlations are not high, but they are all positive, and they are
about as high when opposite turns are compared as when like turns are compared.
This gives some support to the hypothesis that cyclical influences run from the
lagging to the leading indicators as well as from the leading to the lagging
indicators (see Moore, 1983, ch. 23).
Apart from the shift toward shorter recessions and longer expansions and
the associated shift in the intervals between turns in the indicators, the most
notable feature of the record is the absence of major changes in the timing
relationships among the groups of indicators.
XIII. Summary and Conclusions
1 •Businesscycle expansions in the United States became much longer and—41—
recessions much shorter after World War II than before. From 1846 to 1945,
expansions were one and a half times Tas long as recessions. From 1945 to 1982,
they were four times as long. Recessions also became more uniform in length.
Total cycle durations from peak to peak or trough to trough show no significant
trend.
2. Historically, expansions have been long relative to recessions when the
long—run trend in prices was upward, and shorter when the price trend was
downward. This is mainly because expansions generate more upward pressure on
prices than recessions do. However, we find no association between the rate of
inflation during each business cycle and the relative duration of the phases.
3. Business cycle recessions after World War II have been much less severe
than before, as indicated by comprehensive measures of employment, production,
and real income. Shifts in the industrial composition of employment, changes
relating to unemployment and labor—force participation, and trends in the
distribution of personal income by major sources and types have all contributed
to that moderation.
4. Inflation was much higher in 1969—81 than in 1948—69, while real growth
on the average was lower. In the past, periods of relatively low long-term
growth tended to have relatively high variability of annual growth rates.
However, the variability of economic change (measured by standard deviations of
real GNP growth rates) can be judged low by historical standards in both 1948—69
and 1969—81.
5. The average rates of inflation were very similar in the U. S. expan-
sions before and after 1945 but much higher in the po-war than in the prewar
contractions. The inflation of recent decades can be attributed principally to
the (novel) persistence of upward price pressures in contractions, not to an
intensification of such pressures in expansions. Wholesale prices have—42—
continued to show considerable sensitivity to the degree of severity of business
contractions.
6. Short—term interest rates moved with very large relative amplitudes,
high positive conformity, and variable timing in the business cycles of 1949—82.
Before World War I their movements tended to be smaller relative to the cycle
average, and they often had long lags at turning points. Long—term rates
continued to lag behind the short rates most of the time, and to show much
smaller amplitudes of movement and lower conformity to business cycles.
7. The longest available record of the cyclical timing of leading and
lagging indicators covers nearly a century. Apart from a shift towards shorter
recessions and longer expansions, and the associated shift in the intervals
between turns in the indicators, the most notable feature of the record is the
absence of major changes in the timing relationships among the groups of
indicators.
We conclude that various structural, institutional, and policy changes con-
tributed to the evolution of business cycles. The process is continuing. There
have been important changes, yet the most basic characteristics and many outward
manifestations of the business cycle remain much the same (as illustrated by the
timing sequences of the indicators). The cyclical processes are sometimes
stretched out and sometimes compressed, depending on long—term trends in growth,
inflation, etc., as well as the nature, size, and frequency of outside
disturbances.
More intensive research is very much needed on each of the topics we could
address but briefly in this overview. In addition, there are other aspects of
the changing nature of business cycles that we had to exclude. The most import-
ant of these are international. For example, greater conformity of U. S. exports—43—
to business cycles in recent times has been noted by Mintz, 1967, and Moore,
1974. Business cycles, and even major fluctuations in positive growth rates,
appear to be rather integrated among the industrialized trading countries. The
full implications of this fact remain to be analyzed.F—i
NOTES
1.The annals begin in 1790 for England and the United States, in 1840 for
France, in 1853 for Germany,in1867 for Austria, and in 1870 for twelve other
countries on four continents. They end in 1925 (Thorp, 1926) and in 1931
(Thorp, 1932). The NBER chronologies start in 1792, 1834, 1840, and 1866 for
Great Britain, U. S., France, and Germany, respectively. See Moore and
Zarnowitz, 1984, in this volume, for more detail.
2. In contrast, seasonal (daily and annual) cycles, although influenced by
custom, e.g., the timing of holidays, are in large measure part and parcel of
the natural environment of man. Centrally directed or collectivist economies
suffer from various types of instability induced partly by nature (e.g., varia-
tions in harvest) and partly by government and societal actions (e.g., political
purges; planning errors; imposition, resistance to, and relaxation of price and
other controls). In reaction to such disturbances, the overall growth rates of
these systems can vary widely over time, but such fluctuations are very differ-
ent from business cycles, just as closed centralized economies are fundamentally
unlike open market or "mixed" economies.
3. Consider also the classical theories of stationary state and the law of his—
torically diminishing returns, as well as the Maithusian population principle,
in the light of the great increase in the average standard of living in the
densely populated countries of Western Europe and Japan. A hundred years after
Maithus, Veblen anticipated a convergence of modern economies to a chronic state
of mild depression. Keynes sympathized with the intuitive underconsumption
hypotheses of Malthus and Hobson as forerunners of his theory of deficient
effective demand. For appraisals of current interest, see Mitchell, 1927, ch.
IX; Keynes, 1936, ch. 23; Haberler, 1964 (1937), ch. 5; and Burns and Mitchell,
1946, pp. 382—383.F— 2
4. The monthly index of wholesale prices (Warren—pearson, 1854—1891, and BLS,
1891—1933) rose in 13 out of 20 expansions and fell in 17 out of 20 contrac-
tions. Snyder's monthly index of the general price level, covering a broad
assortment of prices (1861—1933) rose in 15 out of 18 expansions and fell in 13
out of 19 contractions. See Burns and Mitchell, pp. 98—101. For confirming
detailed evidence on the behavior of wholesale prices since 1891, seeCagan,
1975, pp. 56—57.
5. The Axe—Houghton index (used for the 1885—91 cycles) is based on pig iron
production, imports, bank clearings outside New York City, and traffic revenue
per mile for selected railroads. The Babson index (for 1891—1920) is a base—
year weighted aggregate of seasonally adjusted physical volume or constant-
dollar series, with coverage expanding from 11 to 33 components. it includes
manufactures, minerals, agricultural marketings, construction, railway freight
ton—miles, electric power and foreign—trade volume, weighted by value—added. The
Federal Reserve Board index of industrial production (1920—82) initially includ-
ed about 50 series. Its coverage increased over time to more than200 series
representing output in manufacturing, mining, and public utilities. The index
of factory employment for 1891—1911 is based on data for Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and New York (Jerome, 1926). The Bureau of Labor Statistics index of
factory employment (1913—1982) is based on a national sample ofcooperating
national establishments. The BLS series on nonagriculturalemployment (used
after 1933) is based on monthly reports from avery large number of establish—
ments (some 160,000). (For more detail, see Moore, 1961, vol.II; U. S.
Department of Commerce, 1977.)
6. For example, the average annual growth rates of real GNP in195''—69 were
3.9% for the United States, 6.8% for West Germany, and 5.3% forFrance. Japants
output grew 9.7% per year in 1952—69, Italy's 5.6% per year in 1951—69. The
corresponding average for the United Kingdom, 1950—69, was 2.7%. See U. S.F- 3
Department of Commerce, 1973, P. 99.
7. Similarly, deposit insurance is believed to have strengthened public con-
fidence in the financial system and prevented runs on the banks that were a
major feature of the crises and some depressions in the pre—Worid War II era.
On the other hand, there are some new sources of instability in this area, such
as recurrent disintermediation, credit controls, and "credit crunches;"
financial innovations and fluctuations in the demand for money and credit; and
the uncertainties of current moves to relax banking and related regulations.
R. Thus the average annual rates of change in output per worker were 2.2% in
Industry and 1.1% in Service (3.4% in Agriculture). The classification here is
much the same as in Table 6, but Industry includes government enterprise
(Service always includes general government). The corresponding statistics for
1959—82 are Tndustry 1 .9% and Service 0.9% (based on BLS employment and BEA
output data).
9. In particular, attempts to close the gaps. in ranks run into problems of com-
parability. The declines in factory employment (BLS) rank the contractions of
1920—21, 1923—24, and 1926—27 in agreement with the labels MD, SR, and MR,
respectively (they are, in percent, —31.1, —13.7, and —5.3). But factory em-
ployment has larger amplitudes than total nonagricultural employment. For
example, the declines in 1929—33 were —43.0% and —31 .6% respectively; in 1937—
38, -21.2% and —10.8%. Real GNP also declined strongly between the years 1944
and 1946 (by some 16 percent), but changes in the composition of output in this
period of transition from wartime to peacetime production make it difficult to
interpret this development.
10. See Flaim, 1979, pp. 16—17.F— 4
11. Over larger periods, labor force growth may respond directly to favorable
economic conditions, using the data in form of changes in percentage points per
decade, Easterlin demonstrates that the contribution of net migration and
participation—rate changes to labor force growth is inversely associated with
the unemployment rate. For 1880—1965, the correlation is —0.83 (Easterlin,
1968, pp. 151—153 and 257).
12. For further evidence, particularly concerning the role of government expen-
ditures and transfer payments, see Beck, 1980, and Cullity, 1983.
13. See Zarnowitz (1981, pp. 476—480) for a discussion of how these periods
were selected, references to related literature, and an attempt to push the
comparison back to 1882.
14. Both 1913—23 and 1929—48 include large wartime expansions as well as major
depressions (with the latter outweighing the former as regards growth effects
but all contributing to high variability).
15. The measures for 1903—48 are calculated from annual data listed in Friedman
and Schwartz, 1982, Table 4 (following p. 121). They refer to the sum of cur-
rency held by the public plus adjusted deposits at all commercial banks;
national income or net national product; and the corresponding implicit price
deflator. The measures for 1969—82 are based on data on M2, GNP, and IPD as
given in the Economic Report of the President, February 1984, Pp. 220, 224, and
291.
16. For the chronology of the "long waves" in prices, see Table 2. On the
shorter "local" trends superimposed on these waves, see Burns and Mitchell,
1946, pp. 438—44" with Chart 65.
17. It should he remembered that these measures are averages in percent per
year. Taking into account the different durations of expansions and contractions
and the lengthening lags in prices, it is still true that some disinflationF- 5
accompanied or followed each of the recessions concerned.
18. Treasury bill rates have become a particularly important and sensitive
indicator of money market conditions. Commercial paper rates have somewhat
different characteristics than they used to have (Selden, 1963) but their
reference cycle patterns since 1949 bear a fair family resemblance to the
Trasury bill rate patterns.R-1
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Durationof Business Cycles in the United States
by Selected Subperiods, 1846—1982
Durationin MOflthSa
Percent of Time
ContractionsBusiness Cycles in Contractiorib
___________________ ____MeanS.D. MeanS.D. All Peacetijt










1846—1945 24 30 17 20 13 50 21
l84&l945 21 36 21 21 14 57 27
1846—1982 32 33 21 18 12 51 22
Peacetime cyciesd
1846—1982 27 28 13 19 12 46 18
24 33 18 19 13 52 25
aBased on the monthly NBER reference dates, except for the two earliest cycles dated in
calendar years (troughs: 1846 and 1848, peaks: 1847 and 1853). Mean =meanduration; S.D.
=standarddeviation, in months. Col. (3) +col.(5) =col.(7), except for rounding.
bMonths of business cycle contractions divided by total months covered, times 100.
CThe following phases designated as contractions in the NBER chronology are treated as
retardations rather than recessions and included, along with the preceding and following
phases, in long expansions: 6/1869—12/1870; 3/1887—4/1888; 6/1899—12/1900. For detail, see
Zarnowitz, 1981, pp. 494—505.
dExciudes five wartime cycles (trough—peak—trough dates) associated with the Civil War
(6/1861—4/1865—12/1867); World War I (12/1914—8/1918—3/1919); World War II (6/1938—2/1945-
10/1945); Korean War (10/1949—7/1953—5/1954); and Vietnam War (2/1961—12/1969—11/1970).
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research. For individual cycle durations, annua
estimates for earlier cycles (1790—1845), and specific references, se Dore and Zarnowtz










32 16 27 18
23 5 17 5
33 24 17 12
45 28 11 4
39 21 28 19


















Long—TermTrends and AverageCyclicalChanges in Prices,
UnitedStates,1789—1982
Firstand Last Year First to Last Year Average % Change in
Trend in Wholesale Pricesa Standings Change (%/year) WPi (annual rate)
No. of WPIb CPIC Business Cycle
Direction Dates Years (1967=100) (1967=100)WPId cpe Expansions Contractions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Rising 1789—1814 25 30—64 30—63 3.1 3.0
Falling 1814—1843 29 64—26 63—28 —3.1 —2.8
Rising 1843—1864 21 26—68 28—47 4.7 2.5
Falling 1864—189632 68—24 47—25 —3.2 —2.0 0.4 —2.3
Rising 1896—1920 24 24—80 25—60 5.1 3.7 9.7 —i .6
Falling 1920—193212 80—34 60—41 —6.9 —3.1 2.1 —13.7
Rising 1932—1982 50 34—299 41—289 4.4 4.0 6.5 1 .8
Total or average 193 1 .2 1 .2
aThe periods of rising and falling trends in wholesale prices agree with those des;nat
by Burns and Mitchell (1946, p. 432) for 1789—1932.
=WholesalePrice Index. U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics index, 1896—1982; Warren
and Pearson index, 1789—1894 (spliced to the BLS index at 1890).
Ccpi =ConsumerPrice Index. Estimated by the BLS by splicing, several indexes together,
namely: 1800—1851, Index of Prices Paid by Vermont Farmers for Family Living; 1851—1890,
Consumer Price Index by Ethel D. Hoover; 1890—1912, Cost of Living Index by Albert Rees; 1913
date, BLS. See Handbook of Labor Statistics (1971, p. 253). We estimate the 1789 figure by
splicing the Warren Pearson wholesale price index to the Vermont price index at 1814 (see
Historical Statistics of the United States, U. S. Department of Commerce, 1975, pp. 201—202).
The figure for these early years are rough approximations only.
dBd on entries in column 4.
eBased on entries in column 5.
Rates of change are computed between three—month average levels centered on business cycle
peaks and troughs as dated in the NB monthly reference chronology.Table 3
Trends in WholesalePrices andtheRelative DurationofBusiness Cycle
















aThrough 1932 based on Burns and Mitchell, 1946, p. 432. Also see
States. For 1932—82, 'ee Moore, 1983, p. 240.
Table 2 for the United
bThe NBER monthly business cycle chronologies are used. From 1789 to 1843 the U. S. dates
are based on Thorp (1926, P. 94) and Mitchell (1927, pp. 444—445), with years of "revival" and
"prosperity" classified as as expansion, and "recession" and "depression" classified as
contraction.
cEntries in parentheses exclude wartime expansions (Civil War, World Wars I and II, Korean
War, and Vietnam War).










































































































Measures of Amplitude of Cyclical Movements in
the United States, by Selected Subperiods, 1885—1982
PercentageChanges Associated with
Number of Business
Cycles (Specific ExpansionsacontractjonsbBusiness Cyclesc
PeriodCycles Covered) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. MeanS.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All cycles A. Industrial Activity or Productiond
1885—1912 8 (8) +38.6 8.5 —15.0 6.6 53.6 8.7
1912—1945 8 (8) +68.2 61.0 —28.6 14.2 96.8 65.8
1945—1982 8 (8) +35.4 21 .1 —10.6 2.9 45.9 19.2
1885—1945 16 (16) +53.4 44.8 —21.8 12.8 75.2 50.5
1885—1982 24 (24) +47.4 39.0 —18.111.8 65.5 44.5
Peacetime cyclese
1912—1945 6 (6) +49.5 41.0 —27.0 16.1 76.5 44.2
1945—1982 6 (6) +25.7 9.3 —11.42.8 37.0 8.4
1885—1945 14 (14) +43.2 26.8 —20.2 12.7 63.4 30.5
1885—1982 20 (20) +38.0 24.1 —17.5 11.4 55.5 28.4
B. Factory or Nonfarm Fmpioyment
All cycles
1891—1914 7 (6) +22.7 12.0 —10.58.4 33.2 11.7
1914—1945 7 (7) +27.5 15.4 —16.5 10.6 43.8 13.0
1945—1982 8 (8) +14.8 9.7 —3.0 1.3 17.8 9.3
1891—1945 14 (13) +25.3 13.6 —13.69.7 38.9 13.1
1891—1982 22 (21) +21.3 13.1 —9.69.2 30.8 15.6
Peacetime cyclese
1914—1945 5 (5) +21.9 13.8 —18.5 12.1 40.4 13.4
1945—1982 6 (6) +11.2 6.5 —3.21.4 14.4 6.6
1891—1945 12 (ii) +22.3 12.2 —14.1 10.6 36.5 12.4
1891—1982 18 (17) +18.4 11.7 —10.3 10.0 28.7 15.1
aMeans and standard deviations (S.D.) of percentage changes measured from thetrough
month in the series to the peak month.
bMeans and S.D. of percentage changes measured from the peak month in the series to the
troughmonth.
cpercentage change in each expansion is added to that in the following contraction
without regard to signs; the means and S.D. shown are based on the resulting measures of
absolute amplitudes of trough—to—trough cycles. Entries in columns 2 and 4 add up to those in
column 6 (disregarding signs), except for rounding.
diBgS_iggi: Axe—Houghton index of trade and inoustrial activity; 1891—1920: Babson
index of physical volume of business activity; 1920—1982: FRB index of industrial production.
eExcludes the cycles associated with the Civil War, World Wars I andII, Korean War, -
Vietnamwar (see Table 1, note c for detail).
ig9i—igi9: Factory employment index, Jerome; 1919—33:Factory employment index, LS
1933—82: Enp1oyment in nonagricultural establishments, BLS.
SOURCE: NBER business cycle files.Table 5
Trendsin IndustrialCoRpositionof Nonagricultural p1oyiuent,
SelectedPeak Years, 1869—1929, and Business Cycle Averages, 1929—81
Most Cyclical Sectors Least Cyclical Sectors Totals
Con— Whole—
Year or tract Manu—Trans. saleFinance Govern.
Perioda Con—fac— comm., and insur.Other Fed., Most Least
struc— tur— publ.retail real ServiceState,Cyclical Cyclical
Mining tioning util.trade estateIndus. & Local sectorsb SectorsC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Percent Distribution
1869 2.5 9.534.0 9.9 15.1 0.8 21 .5 6.8 55.9 44.2
1899 4.0 7.831.7 12.2 17.1 1.9 18.9 6.5 55.7 44.4
1929 2.8 6.228.5 11.0 21.1 4.2 17.5 8.6 48.5 51.4
1929—37 2.5 5.2 26.1 9.5 21.5 4.5 17.7 12.8 43.3 56.5
1937—44 2.1 4.728.7 7.4 19.2 3.5 14.6 19.8 42.9 57.1
1944—48 1.7 4.529.4 7.7 18.9 3.3 13.4 21.1 43.3 56.7
1948—53 1.8 6.329.9 7.7 20.2 3.8 14.7 15.5 45.7 63.3
1953—57 1.4 6.1 29.6 7.1 19.7 4.2 14.8 16.8 44.2 55.5
1957—60 1.3 6.028.2 6.8 20.1 4.4 16.2 16.9 42.3 57.6
1960—69 1.0 5.727.4 6.1 19.5 4.6 17.4 18.3 40.2 59.8
1969—73 0.8 5.025.7 6.0 20.6 5.0 15.8 21.0 37.5 62.4
1973—79 1.0 4.924.5 5.9 18.9 5.4 18.3 21.2 36.3 63.8
1979—81 1.1 4.7 22.1 5.6 22.0 5.6 19.3 19.7 33.4 66.6
SOURCES AND NOTES: 1869—1929: Kendrick, 1961, Table A-Vu, p. 308. Persons engaged are
full—time eguivalent employees and proprietors and unpaid family workers. Coverage:
national economy, excluding farm and agricultural services, forestry, and fisheries.
Government includes armed forces. 1939—1969: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, 1966 and 1973, part III, table 4, p. 76. 1969—1981: 1978 Supplement to,
and more recent issues of Survey of Current Business (Dept. of Commerce). The employment
estimates are based on establishment reports for thesurveysof the U. S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 NOTES TO TABLE 6
aThe percent changes in employment during recessions are computed from
three month standings of seasonally adjusted data centered on business cycle
peak and trough months. Simple averages are used; expressing the figures on a
per year basis would not alter the results significantly. (The average
durations of the recessions were: 1948—60, 10 months; 1970—82, 12 months;
1948—82, 11 months.) The measures are based on the data from the establishment
survey (jobs) of the 3. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
bThe data used to compute these distributions are based on the establish-
ment survey but include also self-employed and unpaid family workers (but not
paid household employees). The total number of jobs represented in the
distributions are (in thousands): 1959, 59,640; 1969, 76,584; 1982, 97,865;
and 1995 (projected) 123,667. See Personick, 1983, Table 2, p. 26. The
"moderate growth projection" for 1995 assumes average annual growth rates of
employment of 1.8 percent from 1982 to 1990 and 1.5 percent from 1990 to 1995.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 NOTES TO TABLE 7
aThe monthly reference dates are determined by the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
bperiod from peak to trough according to the dates listed to the left.
cpercentage change from the peak month or quarter in the series to its
trough month or quarter. Real (constant dollar) GNP is quarterly, the other
series are monthly.
dFrom the lowest month to the highest, in percentage points.
eHighest figure reached during the upswing in unemployment.
prior to 1948 based on cyclical changes in employment in 41 industries.
Since 1948 based on changes in employment over six months, centered on the
fourth month of the span: 1948—59, 30 nonagricultural industries; 1960—71, 172
industries; 1972—82, 186 industries.
on averages of the ranks of entries in columns 1—7. Rank 1 denotes
the mildest, rank 14 the most severe contraction.
hcluding rank 6, the 1945 contraction. See text.
icorrelations across columns 1—7, as indicated in the column and row
headings, with signs disregarded.Table 8
Personal IncomeDistributionby Major Type,
Selected Business Cycle Peak Years, 1913—1981
Percentageof Total Personal Income Accounted for in
Waqes & salaries, private
Farm proprietors' income
Nonfarui proprietors' income
All of the above
A. Categories Declining Most in Recessions
48.0 54.9 53.555.8 58.2
10.1 6.9 7.9 8.6 4.5
15.2 10.1 9.3 10.8 9.6
73.3 71.9 70.775.2 72.3
B. Categories Declining Least in Recessions
wages & salaries, government 4.6 5.8 10.2 8.6 11.5
Other labor income &
transfer payments 0.9 1.7 3.4 6.4 6.4
Dividends 6.0 7.0 6.6 3.5 3.3
Interest 4.0 6.4 5.0 2.5 2.7
Net rent 11 .2 7.0 4.3 3.7 3.8
All of the above 26.7 27.9 29.5 24.7 27.7
SOURCE: 1913—1953, and Creamer (1956, pp. xxix, 9 and 116—123). 1960—1981, computed by
Cullity (1983, Tables 1 and 2) from personal income statistics of the TJ.S.Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. See also Table 9 below.
Type ofIncome 1913 1929 1937 1948 1953 1960 1969 1981


















34.3 38.8 47.0Table 9
Estimated Effects of Shifts in Types of Income on Cyclical
Stabilityof 'Ibtal Personal Income, 1937—1982
Categories Declining
Most in Recessions
Wages & salaries, private
Farm proprietors' income
Nonfarm proprietors' income
All of the above
Categories Declining
Least in Recessions
Wages & salaries, government


































































































NOTE: Percentage changes in 1937—38 and 1948—49 based on Creamer, 1956, p. xxix; in 1948—
80 and 1981—82 based on Cullity, 1983, Table 2. Also see text and Table 8.Table 10

















each period listed, the initial and terminal dates are business cycle peak years
to the annual reference chronology of the National Bureau.
bN1mber of complete years covered.
cNumber of complete peak—to—peak cycles from the initial to the terminalyear.
dCount based on the NBERmonthlyreference chronology.
eEntries in column 4 are divided by the sums of entries in columns 4 and 5 and
multiplied by 100.
Average annual compound growth rate between the initial peak and the terminalpeak
years, in percent.
deviation of the annual growth rates for all years in the given period (as
identified in columns 1—2).
SOURCE: John W. Kendrick, 1961 (GNP in 1958 dollars, 1903—08); U. S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (GNP in 1958 dollars and in 1972 dollars, 1909—
81). Most of the historical data and measures are taken from the U. S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1973.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tiltingof Thrning PointsinTreasury BillRatesandCorporate
BondYields During Business Cycles, 1919—1982
Business Cycle Leads (—)orLags (+), in Months
Treasury Bill RatesCorporate Bond YieldDBond Yield vs. Bill RaIC
Peak Trough PeakTrough Peak Trough Peak
























































































+4Notes to Table 12
aDiscount rate on new issues of 91—day Treasury bills (percent).
bMoodyts Ma.
CEntriesin column 7 are based on matched observations in columns 3 and 5;
entries th column 8, on matched observations in columns 4 and 6.
dTheomitted observations are those inlines 5 and 6 of the table above.
Theywere excluded from the averages in Cagan, 1971, Tables 1—1 through 1—4.
SOURCE:Cagan, 1971,pp. 23—32. Bill rates are seasonally adjusted through
1969,except 1931—47; bond yields are seasonally adjusted 1948—61 only. From
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